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Policy incoherence 
EU fisheries policy in Senegal 
 
"For us, it has no sense or benefit because the industrial fishing boats don't leave 
us any chance of survival. They fish right up to the coast without being stopped and 
the government doesn't have the means to control their activities. If the government 
would listen to us, we wouldn't sign an agreement with people who catch 
everything, even the small fish." 
Mario Alberto Da Silva, West African artisanal fisherman
1 
 
The fisheries sector is an essential component in Senegal’s development 
 
In Senegal, fish provides 75% of local protein needs and fishing plays an important role in 
the national economy. In 2002 it was estimated that the fishing industry generates about 
100,000 direct jobs for Senegalese nationals, of which more than 90% are in small scale 
(artisanal) fishing. Another 600,000 people (15% of the working Senegalese population) 
are employed in related industries.
2  
 
The rising global demand for fish combined with pressures on world supplies means that 
Senegal’s ‘blue gold’ is an increasingly valuable resource. Since 1986, the sector has 
outpaced the groundnut and phosphate sectors in terms of exports, providing about one 
third of the country’s foreign exports.
3 In 1999 the earnings from fishery exports was 
US$314 million. This was twice the country’s debt repayment for that year.
4 Fishing 
access agreements also contribute significantly to government revenue.
5  
 
The Law of the Sea gave Senegal control over its fish resources 
 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982 and in force in 
1994, provides for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. This places 
95% of the world’s fish stocks and 35% of the oceans under the jurisdiction of coastal 
nations. The enforcement of EEZs meant that the open access previously enjoyed by the 
long distance fishing fleets of the EU was lost. Subsequently, the EU had to negotiate 
access through fisheries agreements or through private license and joint venture 
arrangements.  
 
While the UNCLOS certified Senegalese ownership of their fish resources, article 62 of 
the UNCLOS recommends that coastal states authorise other states to catch the ‘surplus’ 





                                                 
1 In WWF, (2004) WWF's work on fishing access agreements 
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/marine/what_we_do/sustainable_fisheries/overfishing/a
ccess_agreements.cfm. 
2 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," (New York and Geneva: UNEP, 2002), 1. 
3 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iii. 
4 Nordberg, Espen, (2003) Fisheries Partnership Agreements - rebranding or a real step towards 
sustainability? http://www.wwf.dk/db/files/parliament_magazine_june_2003_fina.pdf. 
5 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iii. 
6 Article 62, section 2 reads ‘The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living 
resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest 
the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements … give other States 
access to the surplus of the allowable catch….’ 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm  obrown@iisd.org   2 
The Senegalese fish sector has become increasingly export-oriented 
 
Since the early 1980s, key drivers of this change have included:  
 
1.  The non-reciprocal advantages offered under the Lomé Convetions which allowed 
Senegalese fish products duty free access to the European market. This arrangement 
made Senegalese fish products more competitive but also left the country dependent 
on the EU market - the destination for 60% of its fish exports in 2002.
7  
 
When it entered into full force in April 2003, the Cotonou agreement (signed in June 
2000) replaced Lomé. Like Lomé, the Cotonou agreement contains market-access 
provisions based on the non-reciprocal trade preferences extended to the ACP 
countries.
8 These ACP preferences will continue until the end of 2007. The EU is 
seeking to replace the current unilateral preferences with new reciprocal 
arrangements, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), that are due to 
commence in January 2008.
9 However, progress towards these arrangements has 
been slow. 
 
2. An  export subsidy of 15%, later raised to 25%, was first applied to canned tuna and 
later extended to all piscatorial products. While the subsidies were suspended with 
the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, the devaluation more than 
compensated for the subsidy suspension. Devaluation not only encouraged a shift in 




3.  In 1980 Senegal was the first sub Saharan country to negotiate an Extended Fund 
Facility with the IMF and a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the World 
Bank.
11 As a part of the SAP government support for the fisheries sector was first 
reduced and then shifted to export-stimulating mechanisms.
12 
 
4. The Senegalese government has concluded a number of fishing access 
agreements – principally with the EU.
13 Often, developing country governments are 
only able to gain revenue from domestic fisheries if their governance infrastructure is 
well developed. Consequently, Senegal, like many African governments, has tended 
to prefer short-term financial compensation from fisheries access agreements to a 
thriving informal domestic sector from which it is difficult to extract revenue.
14,15  
                                                 
7 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iv. 
8 The Cotonou agreement aims to make EU development co-operation more efficient and is built on 
three inter-related components; political dialogue, trade & investment, and development co-operation. 
Negotiations for the EPAs were launched in September 2002.  
9 Those countries that have not negotiated an EPA once the Cotonou Agreement is phased out will lose 
all preferences accorded under Cotonou. 
10 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 20. 
11 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 15.; These two agreements were suspended and cancelled shortly 
afterwards as the country had failed to meet the performance criteria. Negotiations resumed and the 
country signed a 3 year Structural Adjustment Facility was signed in 1986. SAPs were signed in 1986, 
1987 and 1988. With the SAPs the government gradually withdrew from the fisheries sector and 
replaced official funding with private funding.  
12 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 16. 
13 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iii. 
14 CTA, "EU Common Fisheries Policy and its implications for EU-ACP relations," Agritrade - 
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, 27th July 2004 2004. 
15 NB – whilst it is difficult to extract taxes from an informal fishing sector, a thriving sector does 
generate many forward and backward linkages beneficial for the local economy. Likewise government obrown@iisd.org   3 
 
The growth of fish exports has helped to improve Senegal’s trade balance
16 and revenue 
from the fisheries sector has been an important source for debt repayments.
17 However 
the value of this sector is now being eroded by multilateral trade liberalisation. The 2000 
Cotonou agreement
18 will phase out the trade advantages of the ACP countries after 
2008.
19 Meanwhile, WTO-led moves to reduce worldwide customs tariffs will increase 




Trends in export volumes of Senegalese piscatorial products (tonnes)
21 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 
84,036 91,742 94,102 93,975 111,125  124,673  86,111 93,674 107,080  109,448  124,338 
 
Fishing access agreements between the EU and Senegal date back to 1979
22 
 
The EU has a long history of fishing, strong domestic demand for fish products and a 
socio-economically important fishing industry.
23 With collapsing fish stocks in EU waters 
and over-capacity in the EU fishing fleet there has been a great deal of pressure on the 
European Commission to negotiate access to foreign fishing grounds. In 1979, Senegal 
was the first country to sign a fisheries access agreement with the EU.
24 
 
The EU is the world’s largest market for fish products and is supplied largely from third-
country and international waters. Currently the EU has fisheries access agreements with 
about 20 countries, most of them in Africa. In 2000, the EU paid a total of €137.45 million 
under these agreements.
25 In 1999, fishing agreements provided roughly a quarter of the 





                                                                                                                                            
revenues may be misused and end up in private bank accounts. An ignorance of the former and a desire 
for the latter have perhaps played a role in the profusion of fisheries access agreements in ACP 
countries. It is also more convenient for local governments to collect license fees from Brussels in 
single lump sum payments instead of separate negotiations with individual foreign vessel owners.  
16 The agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin in June 2000 and entered into force on 1
st April 2003. 
See http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/de/article_2201_de.htm  
17 Debt repayments in 2002 as a % of GDP = 4.3% and as a % of exports of goods and services = 
12.6% in UNDP Human Development Report, Human Development Indicators, p. 200 
18 In force on 1 June 2003 
19 The agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin in June 2000 and entered into force on 1
st April 2003. 
See http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/de/article_2201_de.htm  
20 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iv. 
21 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 5 & 18. 
22 NB. Despite the Law of the Sea not coming into force until much later the EC, by negotiating 
fisheries access agreements, was anticipating the introduction of Exclusive Economic Zones. Many 
countries had also unilaterally declared EEZs – among them most of the coastal states of European 
Community.  
23 According to the Commission on Fisheries in 1999 some 1,300 vessels and 20,000 jobs in fishing 
directly depend on fisheries agreements with third countries. In addition the agreements also provide as 
many as 50,000 – 100,000 jobs in ancillary industries such as ship building, fish processing, transport, 
marketing etc. O'Riordan, Brian, "EU distant water fisheries: who pays and who benefits?," El Anzuelo: 
European newsletter on fisheries and the environment 3 (1999): 4. 
24 Nordberg, Fisheries Partnership Agreements - rebranding or a real step towards sustainability? 
25 Niki Sporrong, Clare Coffey, Kate Bevins, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU 
moving towards sustainable development?," (London: Institute for European Environmental Policy, 
2002). 
26 O'Riordan, "EU distant water fisheries: who pays and who benefits?," 4. obrown@iisd.org   4 
There is increasing pressure on the Senegalese fish stocks 
 
The pressure on West African fish stocks increased six-fold between the 1960s and the 
1990s, mainly as a result of fishing by EU, Russian and Asian fleets.
27 The small-scale 
fishing industry of Senegal is now in direct competition with the fishing fleets of the EU to 
supply both the local and the EU market.  
 
According to a 2002 UNEP study ‘a serious risk of local market supply shortages looms 
ahead as fishing efforts shift from locally consumed species to export-oriented ones’.
28 
This has far-reaching effects as local food security and jobs are being threatened by 
shortages in the supply of locally caught fish.
29  
 
The export of fish has raised its price in the domestic market and has also affected the 
selection of fish available to local consumers. The export market has led to concentration 
fish resources in the capital. Consumers in and around Dakar consume about 43 kg/yr 
compared with the average of 26kg/yr for the country as a whole. Markets that are further 
from the coast tend to get less fish and poorer quality. Meanwhile, over-fishing has had 
an adverse impact on fish stocks. Studies show that by 2000 the average landed size of 
most export species have fallen below the level of sexual maturity representing fishing 
activities that have increased beyond sustainable levels.
30  
 
The EU has been strongly criticised for its role in the depletion of West African 
fish stocks 
 
“The fisheries agreements with Senegal illustrate the EU fishery policy in 
West Africa. Since 1979, the EU fishing industry benefited from profitable 
access to the once-rich Senegalese waters, with few restrictions imposed by 
either the EU or Senegalese government. After over 15 years of EU-
Senegalese ‘cooperation’ the assessment is clearly negative, from both an 
environmental and social point of view: fish stocks are depleted and the 
Senegalese artisanal fishery is disrupted.” 
Vlad Kaczynski & David Fluharty, Marine Policy, 2002
31 
 
Although the practice is ‘well-established’, fisheries access agreements with developing 
countries have attracted a great deal of criticism. For example, the Coalition for Fair 
Fisheries Agreements (CFFA), launched in 1992, was incensed by the conclusion of a 
contentious fisheries agreement between the EU and Senegal in 1997.
32  
 
All bilateral fishing agreements are based on the principle of complementarity between 
national and foreign fishing concerns. Prior to all agreements states should; 
¾  assess stock levels of each targeted species 
¾  estimate the sustainable level of annual take on the basis of scientific studies 
¾  determine the balance that can be ceded to foreign fishing fleets.
33  
                                                 
27 Hogan, Rolf, (March 2003) Environmentalists target EU access agreement Science in Africa - 
Africa's First On-Line Science Magazine: http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/index.htm. 
28 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," iii. 
29 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 20. 
30 Nordberg, Fisheries Partnership Agreements - rebranding or a real step towards sustainability? 
31 Vlad M. Kaczynski, David Fluharty, "European policies in West Africa: who benefits from fisheries 
agreements?," Marine Policy 26 (2002): 82. 
32 See http://www.icsf.net/jsp/publication/samudra/pdf/english/issue_17/art03.pdf.  In 1997, three 
groups of NGOs – the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA), Eurostep and the EU-NGO 
Liaison Committee launched a campaign to promote greater consistency between the policy objectives 
of EU development co-operation and the actual practice of fisheries agreement. 
33 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 22. obrown@iisd.org   5 
However, according to UNEP, the concept of complementarity has not functioned 
particularly well in many of the EU fishing agreements.
 34  
 
Controversy has stemmed from;  
•  the ‘export’ of EU fishing fleets to areas with already scarce resources,  
• occasionally excessive fishing rights in fishing agreements stemming from a lack of 
information on fish stocks, the leverage of the European fishing lobby and the need for 
better financing of the governments of the signatory countries,
35 
• agreements that have tended to ignore the interests of coastal communities and 
provided little support for research and development of the fishing sectors in recipient 
countries,
36  
• the limited capacity of signatory states to monitor or control the activities of the EU 
fishing fleets, 
•  the lack of transparency in the negotiation of agreements and a lack of 
communication and coordination between the Directorate General for Development and 
the DG for Fisheries during negotiations which has led to institutional disagreements 
within the EU. 
• subsidies provided to EU vessels that have contributed to structural over-capacity in 
the EU fishing fleet and the over-exploitation of stocks. License fees paid by the 
European boat owners account for only one-third or less of the total value of 
compensation paid by Brussels in fisheries access agreements.
37 These subsidies have 
helped EU vessels continue to fish even when the stocks were too low to make it 
economically profitable. The subsidies also displaces foreign investors and local 
entrepreneurs,
38 
• concerns over illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing by EU fleets, In July 
2004 a Fisheries ‘Compliance Scoreboard’ published by the European Commission 
admitted that undeclared landings, misreporting and under-reporting of catches from 
EU fishing fleets are widespread. A very low level of compliance has been observed 
with regard to reports of catch volume in third party waters.
 39 
•  fishing methods that can cause long term environmental damage,
40 
• the economic benefit for the EU
41 is also questioned, since considerable sums of 
public money are used to subsidise access to resources for private operators.,
42  
•  Fundamentally, the policies have attracted criticism because of the conflicting impact 
of EU fisheries policies on EU development policies in West Africa. 
 
The EU has made a number of international commitments to fish in a 
sustainable way and pursue the goal of policy coherence 
 
                                                 
34 UNEP, "Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related policies: a country study on 
the fisheries sector in Senegal," 22. 
35 Koulaïmah-Gabriel, A. and A. Oomen, "Policy Management Brief 9: Improving coherence: 
challenges for European Development Cooperation," (Maastricht: European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, 1997). 
36 Koulaïmah-Gabriel, "Policy Management Brief 9: Improving coherence: challenges for European 
Development Cooperation." 
37 Vlad M. Kaczynski, "European policies in West Africa: who benefits from fisheries agreements?," 
75. 
38 As a rule the license fee paid by the vessel owner accounts for only one-third or less of the total value 
of compensation paid by Brussels Vlad M. Kaczynski, "European policies in West Africa: who benefits 
from fisheries agreements?," 75. 
39 CTA, "EU Common Fisheries Policy and its implications for EU-ACP relations." 
40 See for example in {Europa, 27th September 2002 #6} 
41 A report by the Institute for European Environmental Policy estimated that between 2000 and 2006 
the EU fisheries sector will be subsidised to the tune of at least €1,253 million Euros each year, Niki 
Sporrong, & Kate Bevins, "Subsidies to the European Union fisheries sector," (London: Institute for 
European Environmental Policy, 2002). 
42 Niki Sporrong, "Subsidies to the European Union fisheries sector." obrown@iisd.org   6 
Incoherent policy frustrates the aims of one sector through the impacts of policies and 
actions in another. In such cases the effectiveness of aid can be significantly reduced, 
reducing the EU’s legitimacy and credibility. The fisheries sector is a glaring example of 
how EU trade policy has worked against its own stated developmental and environmental 
goals.  
 
EU policy coherence is a legal requirement of the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht, 
1992). Article 130v of the Treaty stresses that other EU policies should take account of 
the objectives of development cooperation.
43 In 1995 the EU member states signed on to 
the UN FAO International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which committed 
them ‘to give priority to the nutritional needs of local communities’ when designing 
fisheries policies.
44 The EU member states are also signatories to the Rio Convention 
(1992), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), and the Kyoto International 
Conference on the sustainable contribution of fishing to food security (1995)
45 which all 
deal with fishing, food security and sustainable development and which the fisheries 
agreements may contradict.  
 
The EU’s external fisheries policy is the responsibility of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Fisheries (DGXIV). Development cooperation with the ACP is 
managed by the Directorate General for Development (DGVIII).
46 The DGVIII has 
concluded development cooperation agreements with more than 70 ACP states, in part to 
support the development of effective and efficient artisanal fisheries in each country.
47 
Despite increased communication and collaboration, the incoherence of EU fisheries and 
development policy continues to be a major problem. 
 
To address these criticisms the EU has developed a new approach to Fisheries 
Agreements 
 
In November 1997 the Agriculture and Fisheries Council of the EU adopted a set of 
conclusions in which it reaffirmed its commitment to third-country agreements, but 
recognised the need to adapt the policy in line with both environmental and social 
concerns as well as internal budgetary constraints.
48   
 
The March 2001 EU Green Paper on Fisheries came to the following conclusions on the 
shortfalls of existing access agreements between 1996 and 2000: 
•   unsatisfactory control and surveillance procedures meant the fishing mortality and 
by-catches of the EU fleet were not always known,
49 
•   a lack of proper biological stock assessments meant that the fishing access offered 
to the EU fleet was not always soundly, scientifically based,  
•  some agreements rendered it impossible to react quickly to problems such as a 
reduction in stocks that would require emergency measures,
50   
•  some agreements did not offer enough guarantees for the protection of small-scale 
coastal fisheries.
51,52  
                                                 
43 CTA, "EU Common Fisheries Policy and its implications for EU-ACP relations." 
44 WWF, "Fishing Madness - 101 reasons why the CFP needs radical reform," (WWF, 2002), 12. 
45 EC, (2001) Fisheries and Poverty Reduction - European Commission Communication (2000) 724 to 
the Council and European Parliament Mr Nielsen in agreement with Mr Fischler 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/fish/suppldec2.pdf. 
46 CTA, "EU Common Fisheries Policy and its implications for EU-ACP relations." 
47 CTA, "EU Common Fisheries Policy and its implications for EU-ACP relations." 
48 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 2. 
49 See also http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews/EC.HTM  
50 EC, "Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy," (Brussels: European Commission, 
2001). 
51 EC, "http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/greenpaper/green/volume1_en.pdf," 17. 
52 EC, (2001) Green paper on the future of the common fisheries policy (CFP) 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/index_en.htm. obrown@iisd.org   7 
 
In November 2001 the Council of the European Union voted to accept the European 
Commission Communication (2000) 724 on ‘Fisheries and Poverty Reduction’.
53 This 
recognised that the Commission has made poverty reduction the central objective of its 
development policy and that the fishing sector in developing countries has the potential to 
contribute to poverty reduction. It argued that fishing agreements should allow for the 
legitimate desire of developing countries to develop their own fishing industry. It also 
recognised that EU fisheries, trade, consumer protection and environmental policies can 
affect these industries and committed the EU to improving the coherence of its policies.
54  
 
In December 2002, the European Commission published ‘On an Integrated Framework 
for Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Third Countries’ (COM(2002)637), which 
advocated moving beyond the ‘cash for access’ agreements towards Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements negotiated with third countries.
55  
 
The Commission promises that such agreements will protect the EU distant water fishing 
fleets while strengthening the conditions to achieve sustainable fisheries in the waters of 
the partner country.
56 The communication also makes a specific commitment to greater 
policy coherence though how well that will work remains to be seen.
57 The Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements will fit within the framework of the broader Economic Partnership 
Agreements which will govern trade and development co-operation between the EU and 
ACP countries after the General System of Preferences is phased out under the Cotonou 
agreement.
58 However, as of November 2004, no Fisheries Partnership Agreements have 
been concluded.
59 A decision on whether FPAs represent a real change in EU fisheries 
policy or merely polished rhetoric will have to wait until at least a few FPAs have been 
concluded.   
 
Since January 2003 the latest incarnation of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) has made some key changes 
 
1/. The abolition of public aid for building new fishing boats after the end of 2004 and 
tougher conditions for subsidies for the modernisation of boats. 
The CFP aims to eliminate overcapacity in the EU within the next 10 years, with a 40% 
reduction of the EU fleet in the next 5 years based on a regional analysis of resources 
and capacity. The new system establishes a maximum fleet capacity for each member 
state, which will be reduced as public funding is used to decommission boats. A special 
fund has also been set up for the voluntary reduction of capacity.
 60  
 
                                                 
53 See EC, Fisheries and Poverty Reduction - European Commission Communication (2000) 724 to the 
Council and European Parliament Mr Nielsen in agreement with Mr Fischler. 
54 EC, Fisheries and Poverty Reduction - European Commission Communication (2000) 724 to the 
Council and European Parliament Mr Nielsen in agreement with Mr Fischler. 
55 EU, "Communcation from the Commission on an integrated framework for fisheries partnership 
agreements with third countries," (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). 
56 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 2. 
57 ‘To ensure the coherence between the CFP in its external and internal dimensions, as well as the 
coherence between CFP and Community Co-operation for Development Policy the instruments and 
procedures of each policy must contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives of sustainability 
of fishing activities in the waters of our Partner Coastal States’. EU, "Communcation from the 
Commission on an integrated framework for fisheries partnership agreements with third countries," 9. 
58 Personal communication – those countries that have not negotiated an EPA once the Cotonou 
Agreement is phased out will lose all preferences accorded under Cotonou. 
59 Apparently the latest agreement with Angola (2003) represents a step in the direction of Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements.  
60 WWF, (2004) WWF stop fishing campaign: Europe's new fishing policy 
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/marine/index.cfm. obrown@iisd.org   8 
2/. The incorporation of a more ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management 
through the introduction of recovery plans for threatened stocks and management plans 
for non-threatened stocks. 
The new CFP will progressively implement an ecosystem-based approach, based on the 
precautionary principle, to fisheries management.
61  
 
3/. Increased premiums for the scrapping of vessels in order to achieve additional 
reductions in fishing effort resulting from recovery plans.
62 
Subsidies for building new boats will be eliminated at the end of 2004. So too will public 
funding for the permanent transfer of EU vessels to third countries. Funds saved on boat 
building will be made available for retraining fishermen and compensating coastal 
communities for fishing restrictions imposed under recovery plans. 
 
The new Common Fisheries Policy is still a work in progress and sets the framework for a 
series of legislative changes that will take time to introduce. Nevertheless, considerable 
uncertainty remains over the future shape of the distant water fishing agreements.  
 
The latest agreement with Senegal (2002-2006) made some improvements but 
is still an old style ‘cash for access’ agreement 
 
The latest agreement with Senegal covers a four year period – from July 1
st 2002 to 30
th 
June 2006. The total cost to the EU budget is EUR 64 million, of which 19% is earmarked 
for supporting measures such as monitoring resources, inspection, safety and other 
support for small-scale fisheries. In return, roughly 125 EU vessels get access to 
Senegalese waters.
63 In other words, the Senegalese agreement is very much ‘business 
as usual’ for the EU – the old story of ‘cash for access’. 
 
Regulation of the EU fleet has increased somewhat with the new agreement. For 
example, the areas where EU vessels can fish have been reduced for greater protection 
of the Senegalese artisanal fleet. The agreement has specified annual rest periods, by-
catch limits and increased the mesh size of one type of net to reduce catches of 




Whilst the new agreement is an improvement in several ways, such as the specified rest 
periods, it still contains no maximum catch quotas or effort limits.
66 There is also no 
indication as to what is considered to be sustainable levels of fish stocks or when fishing 
opportunities would be reduced. As the agreement states that a reduction of fishing 
opportunities would lead to a fall in EU payments there is less incentive for Senegal to 
prevent further deterioration in their fish stocks.
67 Moreover, while the regulation of the 
fishing zones is more detailed than under previous agreements, extensive inshore 
trawling is still allowed for smaller trawlers which can approach to within 6 nautical miles 
of the coast.
68,69 
                                                 
61 WWF, WWF stop fishing campaign: Europe's new fishing policy. 
62 WWF, WWF stop fishing campaign: Europe's new fishing policy. 
63 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 9. 
64 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 11. 
65 According to Brian O’Riordan these criteria were included in previous agreements 
66 NB – this is not uncommon in distant water fisheries agreements as it can be hard to measure the 
‘outputs’ (i.e. fish caught). Instead the agreements prefer to try to control the inputs (number of boats 
and length of fishing season) as a proxy for the output. However, it is argued below that the 
calculations used for the estimates of fishing capacity (gross tonnage of vessels) do not account for 
‘technological creep’ – the steady progress of detection and fishing technology. 
67 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 11. 
68 Niki Sporrong, "Fisheries Agreements with third countries - is the EU moving towards sustainable 
development?," 11. obrown@iisd.org   9 
 
Senegal, as yet, has no system for allocating quotas based on overall TAC.
70 Instead the 
EU’s fishing access and intensity of fishing exploitation is assigned in terms of vessel size 
(measured in gross registered tonnage – GRT), the number of authorised vessels and the 
time when they can operate. The size of a vessel, however, bears little relation to its 
harvesting and processing capacity. Technology has progressed and ships of the same 
tonnage are now equipped with more sophisticated detection and fishing equipment that 
allow them to catch more fish than ever before. A 2002 UNEP report points out that 
estimating fishing capacity in terms of gross tonnage is an obsolete method of calculation 
that contravenes international recommendations aimed at promoting sustainable fishing.
71 
Vlad Kaczynski and David Fluharty argue (2002) that this approach allows ‘the EU fleets 




Since there are no catch limits specified under the agreement, and figures on the actual 
catch are not available, the commercial value of the agreement cannot be calculated.
73 
Kaczynski and Fluharty allege, ‘To protect commercial interests of the EU fleets, all 
information related to the execution of the [West African] agreement[s] (actual volume or 
composition of catches, data on effort and other vital information) are not reported to the 
coastal countries despite the contractual obligation in the treaties to do so nor are the 
data made public in Europe’.
74According to Niki Sporrong of the IEEP
75, ‘the lack of catch 
limits remains a key weakness of the agreements, and is in stark contrast to the EU’s 
domestic fisheries management, where targeted stocks are increasingly covered by Total 
Allowable Catch limits (TACs)’.
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‘Does Europe want to help us with development aid or  
do they want to ruin us with subsidised exports?’ 




EU beef exports to West Africa 
 
The debate on EU coherence was launched in 1993 over the dumping of EU subsidised 
beef surpluses to coastal West Africa. It was argued that the CAP subsidies created 
unfair competition for Sahelian farmers and flagrantly undermined European aid projects 
in Sahelian countries which were designed to encourage meat production.
78 
 
EU tariff escalation 
 
The highest tariffs on industrial goods imported to the OECD countries are on those 




Intellectual property rights 
 
The protection of intellectual property rights under the WTO ostensibly promotes research 





Immigration restrictions are imposed for cultural reasons and to sustain domestic wages 





The fishing subsidies of OECD countries absorb $15-20 billion a year but benefit large 
companies more than poor fishing communities and deplete fish populations on which 
poor coastal fisheries depend.
80 According to a 2002 report by WWF these subsidies are 
valued at roughly 20% of the value of global fish catches and can directly lead to over-
capacity and over-fishing.
81 Meanwhile, the WWF estimates that the global fishing fleet is 
250% larger than that needed to catch what the oceans can sustainably produce.
82 
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The Common Fisheries Policy is still exporting excess fishing capacity to many 
developing countries, thus leading to the depletion of fish and marine biodiversity outside 
the EU waters. It is estimated that the European Union is currently paying €1.6 billion 
annually in subsidies. A significant proportion of this is used to pay for third country fishing 
agreements. One effect of this subsidised access is the disincentive for developing 




Subsidised EU dairy exports 
 
Jamaica had a well-established dairy sector but, as a result of import liberalisation, local 
products are now being replaced by cheaper foreign imports. In the late 1990s, unable to 
sell their milk, Jamaican farmers were reported to be dumping the fresh milk in the ditch 
while EU whole milk powder subsidised to the tune of €1 per kilo took over their market.  
 
Meanwhile, there is evidence to suggest that efforts in several African countries to set up 
a dairy industry with the support of development co-operation funds were actually 
undermined by the abundant supply of subsidised EU milk products. In Tanzania, projects 
like the Tanga Dairy Development Programme supported by Dutch development 
cooperation for over 20 years, have only made very slow progress in marketing locally 
produced milk products to the urban consumer in Dar es Salaam.  
 
There are several constraints, but clearly the availability of low-priced powdered milk 
products from the EU (including the Netherlands) and from Switzerland (donated as food 
aid) is a major factor. While the Dutch development co-operation invests some 200,000 
euros per year in the Tanga scheme, Brussels provides 600,000 euros as export 
subsidies on European dairy products to Tanzania.
84  
 
The impact of subsidies on African cotton growers
85 
 
West and Central Africa accounted for 13% of world cotton exports in 2001-2. Cotton 
plays a major role in the economy of West and Central African countries, and production 
there has been expanding over the last two decades. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali 
and Togo, cotton accounts for 5 – 10 per cent of GDP, more than one-third of total export 
receipts, and nearly two-thirds of the value of agricultural exports. Ten million Africans 
depend on cotton for their livelihoods.
86 
 
Production costs for cotton are lower in this region than in most other producer countries. 
However, it has to compete with exports from countries which subsidize their cotton 
producers. Subsidies for producers in the US, China, Greece and Spain were around 
US$6 billion in 2001-2. Moreover, the share of world cotton production benefiting from 
government subsidies increased from 50 per cent in 1997-98 to 73 per cent in 2001-2.  
 
These subsidies had the effect of stimulating production, leading to a reduction in world 
prices. The African exporters suffered a major shortfall in export earnings as a result, 
estimated at US$250 million for 2001-2 and an annual average of US$200 million for the 
preceding five years.
87 Because of the importance of cotton to the local economy, the 
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impact of these price falls has been devastating. Household incomes and agricultural 






High income countries spend about US$300 billion each year on agricultural subsidies; 
more than six times more than they spend on development assistance.
89 
 
Non tariff barriers; brazil nuts, aflatoxins and the SPS agreements 
 
In April 2002, the EU introduced a new regulation to set maximum allowable levels of the 
toxic aflatoxin
90 in cereals, dried fruit and nuts that was stricter than international 
standards (Codex Alimentarius). This has dramatically affected market access for 
producers in low and middle-income countries.  
 
One casualty of this regulation shift was the brazil nut industry in Brazil. Previously worth 
$3 million a year, it was brought to an end by the new regulations. It has been estimated 
that the use of this new standard would reduce the value of African exports of the 
products concerned by US$670 million compared to the level of trade if the Codex 
Alimentarius were used instead. Critics argue that the reduction in risk to human health 






Industrialised countries are home to 1/5 of the world’s population but account for almost 
2/3 of the carbon dioxide that has accumulated in the atmosphere since 1990. Global 
warming will impose heavy costs on developing countries and small island states are 
particularly vulnerable.  
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